Title: Procurement Design with Endogenous Outside Price

Speaker: Liu Dongri, Assistant Researcher of the School of Economics, Shandong University; Doctor of Economics from the National University of Singapore. His research directions include dynamic mechanism design and industrial economics. He has published papers in economics journals such as Games and Economic Behavior and Journal of Mathematical Economics, and presides over projects of the Shandong Provincial Natural Science Foundation.

Abstract: We investigate how a procurer (she, the principal) should acquire an indivisible object, when a potential supplier (he, the agent) who is privately endowed with a provision cost (first-stage type) can conduct a hidden search with an arbitrary intensity for an outside price (second-stage type). We find that the optimal procurement contract employs a put option coupled with a price-matching scheme when the outside price is public, but relies solely on a put option when the outside price is the supplier's private information.

Date & time: 5 June 2025, 12:15 - 13:15

Venue: B321, Zhixin Building, Central Campus, Shandong University