Title: Managing Information Production in Teams

Speaker: Li Fei, Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania; Professor of Economics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Associate Editor of RAND Journal of Economics. His research fields include applied microeconomic theory and industrial organization, with recent interests in information design, intermediary theory, and dynamic games in IO.

Abstract: A principal faces a series of related decisions under imperfect information and employs agents to acquire information at a cost. The principal designs task allocation and payment schemes to ensure information acquisition and truthful reporting. We characterize the optimal joint design, highlighting a trade-off between task diversification and peer monitoring efficiency. The optimal deterministic design features a chain structure of peer monitoring, while stochastic schemes mitigate this tension.

Date & time: 17 December 2024, 14:30 – 16:00

Venue: B321, Zhixin Building, Central Campus, SDU