Title: Designing Interim Deadlines for Time-Inconsistent Agents

Speaker: Gao Buqu, Assistant Professor, School of Economics and Trade, Hunan University; Ph.D. Boston University. Research fields: industrial organization, behavioral economics, applied micro theory. (Selected publications include Management Science.)

Abstract: In many tasks people face productivity shocks and procrastination (time-inconsistency), so interim deadlines must trade off flexibility and commitment. In a principal–agent framework we study optimal interim-deadline design and show that profit-maximizing contracts may set fewer interim deadlines for time-inconsistent agents than for time-consistent ones; compared with welfare-maximizing contracts, profit-maximizing ones may grant more autonomy to agents.

Date & time: 28 November 2024, 16:00–17:30

Venue: Room B438, Zhixin Building, Central Campus, Shandong University