Topic: Pick-an-Object Mechanisms

Lecturer: Associate Prof. Inacio Bo, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics

Time: 14:30-16:00 p.m. May 10th,2023 (Wed.)

Venue: Zhixin Building B336, Central Campus

Abstract:We have introduced a new series of mechanisms for the unilateral matching market, known as the "Select Objects" (PAO) mechanism. When implementing allocation rules through PAO, agents are required to select an object from a personalized menu. These choices may later be rejected, and these agents will be presented with new menus. When the program ends, agents are assigned to their last selected object. We have described allocation rules that can be sequenced by the PAO mechanism, as well as allocation rules that can be implemented in robust real equilibrium. We have demonstrated that the use of PAO is reasonable compared to direct mechanisms, as its equilibrium behavior is closely related to the equilibrium behavior in Obvious Policy Protection (OSP) mechanisms, but it implements commonly used rules such as Gale shapley DA, which OSP cannot implement. We conducted laboratory experiments and compared the real behavior of implementing different rules using PAO, OSP, and direct mechanisms.